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LmGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 
IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958. By Edward A. Purcell, Jr. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. x, 446. $59. 
Edward A. Purcell1 begins his book Litigation and Inequality: 
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction in Industrial America 1870-1958, with a 
letter written in 1934 from a Cleveland lawyer to his new client, the 
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. The railroad had hired the lawyer to de-
fend against several pending tort suits. The lawyer and his staff then 
"worked up a technic which ought to assure the best possible re-
sults";2 the "technic" was to remove the lawsuits from state court to 
federal court. As Purcell explains, getting into federal court provided 
large corporate defendants, like a railroad, with enormous procedural 
and extralegal advantages over individual plaintiffs. 
Litigation and Inequality focuses upon these procedural and juris-
dictional rules - such as removal, joinder, choice of forum, and 
amount in controversy - that create "a grab bag of tools that parties 
attempt to use ... during private litigations" (p. viii). Purcell's book 
also looks behind such rules to emphasize the historical and social 
conditions of the parties; he writes, "to truly understand [procedural 
and jurisdictional rules] one must persistently ask who uses them, how 
they use them, and what results they achieve with them" (p. viii). 
Purcell ties together these two dimensions - technical legal doc-
trines and the social conditions of the litigating parties - into a uni-
tary concept that he calls a "social litigation system" (p. 3). The 
author defines a social litigation system as a pattern of regularly recur-
ring legal disputes involving parties with similar social characteristics 
who regularly litigate the same types of issues and legal rules. 
Although a social litigation system may sound like an abstract con-
cept, a 'ook to today's highly specialized legal profession would proba-
bly identify groups of lawyers who consistently litigate certain types of 
claims between similar types of parties and rely over and over on cer-
tain legal rules. Purcell observes that these systems are perhaps more 
social than legal: 
We commonly recognize, at least implicitly, that distinct types ofliti-
gation differ as much in the social conditions that shape them as they do 
in the legal issues that they present. Antitrust litigation in the federal 
courts is J?rofoundly different from landlord-tenant litigation in the hous-
ing courts of large cities. Securities actions have little in common with 
deportation proceedings, and suits involving personal injuries are quite 
1. Professor of Law, New York Law School. 
2. P.13 (quoting Letter from Newton D. Baker to John J. Cornwell (Nov. 28, 1934) (on file 
at the Library of Congress, Newton D. Baker Papers, Box 39, Folder "B&0-1934")). 
1700 
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different from school desegregation cases .... Yet in spite of the various 
social differences, we generally identify such types of litigation, as I have 
just done, by their legal rather than their social characteristics. The for-
mer may not always and for every purpose be the most useful way to 
categorize, examine, and understand them. [p. 3] 
Purcell's book is a history of one of these social litigation systems. 
His goal is to use the concept of a social litigation system to describe 
and explain a certain type of recurring historical behavior. Purcell 
hones in on the United States of the 1870s to the 1940s, the "Age of 
Industrial America," a time of rapid economic development and the 
rise of powerful national corporations. These social conditions led to 
the social litigation system that Purcell analyzes, which he calls the 
"system of corporate diversity litigation." Such a system consisted of 
two types of claims by individual plaintiffs against national corpora-
tions:· (i) negligence actions against manufacturers and railroads, usu-
ally by injured employees, and (ii) contract claims against insurance 
companies, usually by claimants under small life, health, and disability 
policies. 
Purcell identifies two basic "mainsprings" of the system of corpo-
rate diversity litigation. First, the indhidual plaintiffs and corporate 
defendants had drastically unequal resources, and this wealth disparity 
affected almost every aspect of the system. Second, the parties invaria-
bly wanted to litigate in different forums. Federal courts provided cor-
porations with a variety of advantages, while individual plaintiffs were 
usually better off litigating in state courts. A third general theme runs 
throughout the book: the importance of out-of-court settlf!ment, what 
Purcell calls the "informal legal process" (p. 6). In keeping with his 
aim of discovering ~'what litigants were actually doing" (p. vii), Pur-
cell emphasizes that the parties resolved an overwhelming percentage 
of these disputes out of court - an informal resolution central to the 
system of corporate diversity litigation. 
The first half of Purcell's book describes the emergence of the sys-
tem of corporate diversity litigation in the 1870s and the growth of the 
system up to its peak around the tum of the century. The book's first 
three chapters explore the social and legal background that gave rise 
to this system. Chapter One describes the Supreme Court cases that 
developed the right of corporations to remove cases to federal court 
based on diversity jurisdiction. 3 This chapter also examines a variety 
of historical evidence to demonstrate the basic characteristics of the 
system of corporate diversity litigation. From this evidence, Purcell 
3. The U.S. Constitution extends the federal judicial power to jurisdiction over claims be-
tween "Citizens of different States." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
Congress granted the lower federal courts this type of jurisdiction. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 
§ 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988)). A federal court thus has 
jurisdiction over a claim by an in-state plaintiff against a foreign corporation even over state law 
tort and contract claims. This is co=only known as "diversity" jurisdiction. 
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concludes that negligence actions and suits on insurance contracts, 
most of which were between resident plaintiffs and foreign corpora-
tions, dominated the federal courts' diversity dockets, that corporate 
defendants were usually the party to invoke removal, and that corpo-
rations were highly successful when they removed diversity actions. 
Chapters Two and Three explain why foreign corporations rou-
tinely preferred to remove these diversity suits to federal court. Re-
moval to federal court made litigation more difficult, complex, 
expensive, time-consuming, and intimidating for the individual plain-
tiffs. Purcell identifies three basic reasons why removal thus enabled 
corporations to exploit their greater economic and social power, usu-
ally to negotiate discounted settlements. First, most observers consid-
ered federal judges to be sympathetic to corporate interests. Even if 
this perception was false, the perception itself discouraged individual 
plaintiffs whose claims were removed to federal court, enabling the 
corporate defendants to pressure the plaintiffs into small settlements. 
Second, an ordinary lawsuit in federal court was often more bur-
densome to the litigants than a suit in state court. The triple burdens 
of distance, delay, and complexity disproportionately hindered indi-
vidual plaintiffs because they had fewer resources and less-experienced 
legal counsel than their corporate opponents. At a time when travel 
was extremely expensive and inconvenient, the distant locations of fed-
eral courts posed great burdens for plaintiffs.4 This disparity meant 
that removal to federal court often required an individual plaintiff to 
endure the cost and inconvenience of traveling far from home. 
Another burden was delay. Purcell observes that "[b]y the tum of 
the century the average length of time between commencement and 
termination of a federal civil action was about three and a half years" 
(p. 50). Although he fails to offer reliable data to generalize about the 
duration of state court litigation, Purcell does use scattered data and 
anecdotal sources to argue that many state courts were disposing of 
their cases more rapidly than the federal courts. Finally, Purcell ar-
gues that legal practice in federal courts was generally more complex 
than in state courts: the law of removal itself was complicated, the 
federal courts' procedural rules in diversity cases derived from a con-
fusing hybrid of state and federal rules, and appeals in federal courts 
exacerbated the above-mentioned problems of distance and delay. All 
these burdens magnified economic and social inequalities that already 
existed between individual plaintiffs and corporate defendants. 
The third reason corporate defendants preferred to remove diver-
sity suits to federal courts lay in the advantages conferred by the fed-
4. Purcell explains that "almost all of [the counties in the United States] had a county seat 
that hosted one or more terms of a state court of general jurisdiction. In contrast, federal courts 
convened in fewer than one county in every ten." Pp. 46-47 (footnote omitted). 
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eral common law.5 The complexity of the federal common law and 
uncertainty over whether it - or state law - would apply to a plain-
tiff's claim added to the difficulty of federal court litigation. Purcell 
further argues that the federal common law of industrial torts and in-
surance contracts provided a variety of other advantages to corporate 
defendants in federal diversity litigation. Purcell contends that all 
three of these reasons take on particular importance in the informal 
legal process, so that removal and the threat of removal were powerful 
tools to force individual plaintiffs to settle their claims unfavorably. 
Because the parties desperately wanted to litigate in different 
courts, their lawyers developed various creative strategies in what Pur-
cell calls "The Battle for Forum Control." Chapters Four and Five 
describe the two principal tactics that plaintiffs employed to keep their 
claims out of federal court: (i) they discounted their claims below the 
minimum amount-in-controversy requirement to establish federal di-
versity jurisdiction, 6 and (ii) they joined nondiverse parties as co-
defendants to defeat the federal jurisdictional requirement of complete 
diversity between adverse parties. 7 These chapters also describe cor-
porate defendants' attempts to counter these devices. Chapter Six 
concludes the first half of the book by critically examining the ration-
ale that most corporations offered to explain why they preferred the 
federal courts - namely, the possibility of local prejudice in the state 
courts. 
The second half of the book traces the evolution, decline, and dis-
appearance of the system of corporate diversity litigation from the 
tum of the century until the 1950s. Chapter Seven describes the devel-
opment of a variety of factors that decreased the burdens on individual 
plaintiffs of litigating in federal court. These developments included 
improvements in transportation and federal court administration that 
lessened the burdens of distance and delay, as well as legislative re-
5. Rooted in the Supreme Court's 1842 decision in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), 
the federal common law permitted courts to fashion independently a body of common law rules 
in certain areas. In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), however, the Supreme Court 
abolished the general federal common law. 
6. Diversity jurisdiction only extends to cases in which the "amount in controversy," typi-
cally the amount of the plaintiff's claim, exceeds a statutorily prescribed minimum. Congress 
has often amended this statutory amount. For example, the Judiciary Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 
373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552, raised the jurisdictional amount from $500 to $2000, and the Judicial 
Code of Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091, raised it again to $3000. In 1988 
Congress raised the amount from $10,000 to $50,000. Judicial Improvements and Access to 
Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 20l(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(a) (1988)). 
7. The Supreme Court in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), held that 
diversity jurisdiction required "complete" diversity between the parties, meaning that the citizen-
ship of each of the plaintiffs in an action could not overlap at all with the citizenship of any of the 
defendants. Thus an in-state plaintiff could destroy complete diversity by joining an in-state 
defendant to the plaintiff's claim against a foreign corporation, depriving the federal courts of 
jurisdiction. 
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forms and the rise of a specialized plaintiffs, personal injury bar to 
cope with the complexity of litigation in the federal courts. 
Chapters Eight and Nine trace the development of new litigation 
strategies over the battle for forum control as the system evolved into 
the twentieth century. Chapter Eight focuses on a new tactical device 
employed by plaintiffs - interstate forum shopping. Because most 
state courts and legislatures considered corporations to be present in 
any state in which they did business (p. 181), plaintiffs started to bring 
their claims against corporations in distant states that offered the pos-
sibilities of more favorable law or larger jury verdicts. Corporate de-
fendants retaliated with a variety of tactics to ensure that plaintiffs 
sued close to home. Chapter Nine then details the evolution in the 
system as insurance contract litigation became increasingly volatile in 
the 1920s and 1930s because of changes in federal law that ,increased 
the opportunities for insurance companies to get into federal court. 
Chapter Ten describes the disintegration and disappearance of the 
system in the decade after 1937. Continued advancements in trans-
portation - in particular, the widespread use of the automobile -
greatly lessened the burdens of distance and travel, improvement in 
federal court administration reduced delay, and the election of Presi-
dent Franklin Delano Roosevelt changed the political image and sym-
pathies of the federal courts. Finally, in the 1938 case of Erie Railroad 
v. Tompkins, 8 the Supreme Court abolished the general federal com-
mon law. "By the end of the 1940s/, Purcell writes, "the formal law 
offered relatively little incentive to choose between a state and a fed-
eral forum in a diversity action', (p. 246). 
In Chapter Eleven, Purcell reviews the entire history of the system 
of corporate diversity jurisdiction and comes to a mix of eclectic con-
clusions. Three in particular merit consideration. 
First, Purcell casts doubt on two conventional historical assump-
tions about the relationship between corporations and federal courts in 
this time period: the corporations' oft-stated rationale for their prefer-
ence for the federal courts, and the conventional wisdom that federal 
judges during this period harbored a procorporation class bias. Cor-
porations ostensibly preferred to litigate in the federal courts in order 
to avoid local prejudice and to gain the benefits of a uniform federal 
common law. Purcell contends, however, that corporations actually 
gained powerful legal and extralegal advantages by using the federal 
courts. Further, he argues that the federal common law appealed to 
corporate defendants because of its particular substance, not because 
of its uniformity. Purcell is also skeptical of the idea that federal 
judges harbored a class bias in favor of national industry. Although 
he concedes that federal forums provided advantages to corporations, 
8. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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the author asserts that this was because of a mix of factors - such as 
distance, delay, complexity, and the substance of federal common law 
- and not because of the social attitudes of federal judges. In fact, 
Purcell notes that the Supreme Court in particular ruled in favor of 
corporations less often than lower courts did and often fashioned 
proplaintiff procedural and jurisdictional rules (p. 8). 
Second, the book's final chapter reconsiders two hypotheses that 
scholars have offered to explain tort law in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries: the "subsidy thesis" and the "efficiency the-
sis." The subsidy thesis claims that tort law around the turn of the 
century imposed limited rules of liability on industry, thereby provid-
ing a de facto subsidy to young business enterprises. 9 In contrast, the 
efficiency thesis maintains that this same tort law allocated the costs of 
accidents among the various parties involved in an economically effi-
cient manner. 10 Purcell's book casts doubt on both theses and high-
lights a deficiency in both - their overreliance on the substantive law. 
Purcell maintains that the legal system conferred a kind of de facto 
subsidy on business enterprise. This subsidy came, however, not 
through the substantive common law of tort, but in the social, proce-
dural, and institutional factors that permitted corporations to reduce 
the amount individual plaintiffs would accept in out-of-court settle-
ments. To the extent these factors permitted corporations to impose a 
disproportionate amount of accident costs on plaintiffs, the legal sys-
tem operated inefficiently. 
Finally, Purcell proposes his concept of a "social litigation system" 
as a useful instrument to study the interrelationship between law, his-
tory, and the social sciences as part of the search to discover how the 
political and social worlds "really worked."11 By concentrating on as-
pects of this history beyond the substantive law, Purcell has provided a 
valuable reminder to the legal historian - the technical rules of proce-
dure and jurisdiction and the social conditions and resources of the 
litigants often determine the outcome of a legal claim. 
Litigation and Inequality has drawbacks: it is longer than neces-
sary, and although exhaustively researched, the book fails to provide 
adequate evidence to support many of its most significant claims.12 
Nevertheless, in its hypothesis of a system of corporate diversity litiga-
9. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 409-27 (1973); LEO-
NARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 166 (1957); 
Charles O. Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REv. 359, 385 (1951). 
See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 
at 63-108 (1977) (discussing the subsidization of economic growth through the legal system). 
10. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972). 
11. Purcell writes that "[f]or more than a century professional scholars in law, history, and 
the social sciences have sought to discover how the political and social worlds 'really worked.' " 
P. 248. He offers the book as a further inquiry into the dynamics of the "law in action" rather 
than the "law in books." P. 248. 
12. For example, Purcell offers little evidence to support his claim that state courts processed 
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tion, the book advances a new way of thinking about a portentous era 
in U.S. legal history. Perhaps most prominently, the book serves as a 
detailed reminder of the importance to legal history of both social con-
ditions and jurisdictional and procedural legal doctrines. 13 For those 
scholars still interested in finding out how the world "really worked," 
Purcell offers valuable insights. 
- David A. Luigs 
cases more rapidly than federal courts, and he acknowledges the difficulty of discovering strong 
evidence about the informal legal process. 
13. Purcell encourages scholars to explore the richness of these doctrines, observing that 
[p]rocedure offers a particularly rewarding subject to the legal historian because it consti· 
tutes the realm of irony in the law ..•. [I]n qualifying, frustrating, or transforming the 
significance of substantive rules and rights, procedure can illuminate their practical human 
significance and spotlight the critical points where social factors impinge most sharply on 
the legal process. 
P. 249. 
